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I. INTRODUCTION
[1] Informal money transfers present a significant challenge to combating
the financing of terrorist organizations worldwide. Although the U.S. and
other governments have implemented measures to restrict terrorist
financing, these measures were designed to regulate formal financial
institutions. Accordingly, those seeking to avoid detection have turned to
other methods of transferring money, such as commodities trades,
hawala,1 and digital currencies.2 Many terrorist operations do not require
large sums of money, making the detection and prevention of even modest
transfers important. For example, the September 11 Commission
estimated the cost of carrying out the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings, which

∗

William Hett earned his J.D. at the University of Iowa College of Law.
Hawala refers to an ancient system of transferring money that originated in South Asia.
The system is based on communications between individuals in different regions. A user
gives cash to a hawala dealer in one place who then calls a friend or acquaintance in the
destination city with instructions to pay cash to a named recipient. The system generally
keeps no record of individual transactions. Instead, dealers keep track of total balances
owed by one another, which could include multiple transactions back and forth over a
significant period of time. PATRICK M. JOST & HARJIT SINGH SANDHU, INTERPOL GEN.
SECRETARIAT, THE HAWALA ALTERNATIVE REMITTANCE SYSTEM AND ITS ROLE IN
MONEY LAUNDERING (2000),
http://www.interpol.int/Public/FinancialCrime/MoneyLaundering/hawala/default.asp.
2
Todd M. Hinnen, The Cyber-Front in the War on Terrorism: Curbing Terrorist Use of
the Internet, 5 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 5, 3-4 (2004).
1
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killed 224 people in East Africa,3 at only $10,000.4 Al Qaeda funded the
October 18, 2002 bombing in Bali for around $20,000,5 killing 202,6 and
the 2004 Madrid train bombings cost approximately $70,000,7 killing
191.8 The London bombings of July 7, 2005 were estimated to have cost
several hundred to 8000 pounds sterling (up to $15,600)9 and killed 52.10
Even large-scale attacks with high levels of devastation are within reach of
a well-financed terrorist group. The September 11, 2001 attacks in the
United States were relatively inexpensive to carry out at an estimated
$400,000 to $500,000,11 killing approximately 3,007 people.12 The low
financial cost of carrying out these deadly attacks necessitates a focus on
both traditional and non-traditional methods of transferring funds.
[2] The availability and popularity of digital currencies and online
payment processing systems have dramatically increased in recent years.13
3

NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT 70 (2004), http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf.
4
Laura K. Donohue, Anti-Terrorist Finance in the United Kingdom and United States, 27
MICH. J. INT’L L. 303, 305 (2006).
5
JOHN ROTH, DOUGLAS GREENBURG & SERENA WILLE, NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST
ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, MONOGRAPH ON TERRORIST FINANCING: STAFF
REPORT TO THE COMMISSION 27-28 (2004), available at http://www.911commission.gov/staff_statements/911_terrfin_monograph.pdf.
6
Four Sentenced for Killing Christians, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 12, 2007, at A19.
7
Factbox-The Madrid Train Bombings and What Happened Next, REUTERS NEWS, Feb.
14, 2007.
8
The Madrid Bomb Trials: Historic Verdicts, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 3, 2007, at 60.
9
SIOBHAN O’NEIL, DOMESTIC SOCIAL POLICY DIVISION, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS,
TERRORIST PRECURSOR CRIMES: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS 4 (2007), available
at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL34014.pdf.
10
Some Recent Terror Attacks and Plots, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 6, 2007, at A12.
11
Donohue, supra note 4, at 305.
12
Data based on numbers collected from the National Consortium for the Study of
Terrorism and the Responses to Terrorism. National Consortium for the Study of
Terrorism and the Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database,
http://www.start.umd.edu/data/gtd (follow “GTD2” hyperlink; then select “Browse by
Date” and insert 09/11/2008; then select “Browse by Country” and insert “United States
of America”) (last visited Nov. 17, 2008).
13
See Catherine Holahan, Policing Online Money Laundering: The Financial Action
Task Force Is Developing Recommendations for International Regulations to Combat
Financial Cybercrime, BUS. WK., Nov. 6, 2006,
http://businessweek.com/print/technology/content/nov2006/tc20061106_986949.htm
(stating PayPal alone processed $9.1 billion in the final quarter of 2006).
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Some of the services currently in operation include Paypal, e-gold, Liberty
Reserve, GoldMoney, V-Cash, 1mdc, Webmoney, IntGold, Stormpay, eDinar, cashU, and BankServ.14 Some of these services require only a
valid e-mail address to initiate an account, with the names and locations of
the actual users unknown (or fabricated).15 Although anonymous money
transfer services may offer opportunities for legitimate businesses to
exchange payments with customers worldwide, they also provide an
extremely useful tool for drug traffickers and terrorist organizations to
transfer money with a lower risk of detection.
[3] Because of the new and unique nature of these digital currencies,
transfers are largely unregulated and are not subject to the same
requirements as most financial institutions.16 Normally, transfers by
financial institutions are subject to a strict regulatory regime, which
includes maintaining customer identification records, filing Suspicious
Activities Reports (SARs), mandatory reporting on currency transfers of
$10,000 or greater, and “know your customer” requirements.17 Many
digital currency providers require no customer identification and have
little capability or desire to detect or report suspicious activities.18 For this
reason, such services offer opportunities for terrorist organizations to
transfer money without the risks of using traditional financial institutions.
14

See, e.g., Paypal, https://www.paypal.com (last visited Nov. 11, 2008); e-gold,
http://www.e-gold.com (last visited Nov. 11, 2008); Liberty Reserve,
http://www.libertyreserve.com/en (last visited Nov. 11, 2008); GoldMoney,
http://goldmoney.com (last visited Nov. 11, 2008 ); V-Cash, http://v-cash.com (last
visited Nov. 11, 2008 ); 1mdc, http://www.icegold.com/1mdc.php (last visited Nov. 11,
2008); WebMoney, http://www.wmtransfer.com (last visited Nov. 11, 2008); IntGold,
http://www.aboutus.org/Intgold.com (last visited Nov. 11, 2008); StormPay,
http://www.stormpay.com (last visited Nov. 11, 2008); e-dinar, http://www.e-dinar.com
(last visited Nov. 11, 2008); CashU, http://www.cashu.com (last visited Nov. 11, 2008);
BankServ, http://www.bankserv.com (last visited Nov. 11, 2008).
15
See, e.g., Hinnen, supra note 2, at 33; see also e-gold, http://www.egold.com/unsecure/qanda.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2008) (stating that “there is no credit
check” to open an e-gold account).
16
See Reform Requirements for Reporting Cash Transactions: Hearing on H.R. 5341
Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, 109th Cong. (2006)
(statement of Kevin A. Delli-Colli, Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Investigations,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security).
17
See Donohue, supra note 4, at 372 (discussing some of these anti-terrorism
regulations).
18
See Delli-Colli, supra note 16.
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[4] True, digital currency providers operating in the U.S. have recently
experienced heightened scrutiny and now face the prospect of tighter
regulation. In April 2007, the U.S. government indicted e-gold on charges
of money laundering, conspiracy, and operating an unlicensed moneytransmitting business.19 The e-gold case highlights that U.S. regulations
were not designed with digital currencies in mind.20 The e-gold
defendants made plausible arguments that at least parts of their operation
should not be not subject to the current regulatory regime.21 If the
regulations are left unchanged, other digital currency providers could
possibly tailor their operations to be exempt from the regulations that
govern other financial institutions.
[5] U.S. regulation and prosecution alone cannot address the worldwide
reach of these digital currencies. Many digital money services maintain
their operations outside U.S. jurisdiction. For example, CashU is operated
by Maktoob, Inc. in Jordan.22 Although some transfers channeled through
banks and currency exchanges in the United States would likely be subject
to U.S. regulation, many would not, and some of these exchangers offer
cash card services redeemable at ATMs worldwide, including in the
United States.23 Asserting jurisdiction for regulation of such exchanges is
a major problem, as it is with Internet gambling.24 Thus, continued
19

Indictment at 1, United States v. E-gold, Ltd. et al., 550 F. Supp. 82 (D.D.C. Apr. 24,
2007) (No. 07-109), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/ceos/Press%20Releases/DC%20egold%20indictment.pdf
[hereinafter e-gold Indictment]; see also Brian Doherty, Testing Medal: The DOJ Targets
E-gold, REASON MAG., Aug. 1, 2007, available at
http://www.reason.com/news/printer/120955.html (stating that a grand jury indicted egold’s enterprise, parent company, and three officers).
20
See infra Part III.B.
21
Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts Two,
Three and Four of the Indictment at 13-14, United States v. E-gold Ltd., 550 F. Supp. 82
(D.D.C. Feb. 11, 2008) (No. 07-109) [hereinafter Memorandum of Law in Support of
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss].
22
Maktoob Group, About Us, http://www.maktoobgroup.com/inside.htm (last visited
Nov. 17, 2008).
23
See, e.g., Cash Cards International,
http://www.cashcards.net/rep/99152/home_page_text.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2008).
24
See Ronnie D. Crisco, Jr., Comment, Follow the Leaders: A Constructive Examination
of Existing Regulatory Tools That Could Be Applied to Internet Gambling, 5 N.C. J.L. &
TECH. 155, 158 (2003) (“[t]he majority of Internet gambling businesses are located in
tax-havens like Antigua and Belize that impose virtually no formal restrictions on these
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International efforts are essential and will be carried out by organizations
such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).25
[6] This article begins by describing the nature of digital currencies, how
they work, and how a terrorist operation might use transfers of value
through a digital currency to access usable cash in the United States or
other target countries. Part II discusses the current U.S. legislative and
regulatory framework of financial institutions and how digital currency
providers fit into this regime. Part III examines the enforcement of U.S.
regulations, specifically the e-gold prosecution and the use of 18 U.S.C. §
1960 to prosecute unlicensed money transmitting businesses. Part IV
discusses the future of digital currencies in the United States and the
effects of prosecutions like the e-gold case on those businesses. Finally,
Part V examines the problems of the current regulatory regime and the
challenge of regulating digital currencies outside U.S. jurisdiction. The
article proposes that in order to better protect against the risks posed by
digital currencies, the United States should consider the following
measures: (1) specifically include both digital currency providers and
digital currency exchangers in the regulations defining a “money services
business” to subject them to regulation as “financial institutions”; (2)
create due diligence requirements for currency exchangers that accept
digital currencies for the purchase of ATM cash and debit cards, with the
degree of customer identification and verification procedures increasing
for purchases and transfers of higher values; (3) place specific per day and
per year value limits on purchases of cash cards with digital currencies,
and limits on the number of cash cards that each individual may purchase;
and (4) prohibit U.S. banks and card system networks from processing
ATM/debit payment requests from digital currency exchangers located
abroad that deal in digital currencies.

enterprises.”); cf. Adrian Parke & Mark Griffiths, Why Internet Gambling Prohibition
Will Ultimately Fail, 8 GAMING L. REV. 295, 296-97 (2004) (stating that it is difficult to
differentiate between legal and illegal data transfers when monitoring online gambling
and that many transfers are to Internet gambling providers registered in countries with
limited restrictions).
25
See infra text accompanying note 43.
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A. HOW DIGITAL CURRENCIES WORK
[7] Digital currencies function as an online exchange medium by allowing
transfers of value without the use of hard currency or electronic banking
channels.26 One of the rationales for using a digital currency is “to
facilitate online transactions without regard for underlying currencies or
access to foreign exchange.”27 Digital currencies serve as an alternative
method of exchange for those conducting transactions online with known
or unknown parties.28 These currencies are universal, sometimes tied to
the exchange rates of hard metals, such as gold or silver, or other
commodities.29 The digital currency provider issues the user an account,
funded through a currency exchanger that deals in the specified
currency.30 Exchangers accept cash, checks, credit cards, wire transfers,
commodities, or other items of value in exchange for funding the
customer’s account.31 Once funded, the customer accesses the digital
currency account online and transfers the funds to another account holder
located anywhere in the world.32
[8] Some of the existing digital currencies, or online payment processing
systems, include Paypal, e-gold, Liberty Reserve, GoldMoney, V-Cash,
1mdc, Webmoney, IntGold, Stormpay, e-Dinar, Cash-U, and BankServe.33
Each of these digital currencies varies slightly in operation. For example,
26

Digital Currency is perhaps the least well-known type of Internet payment system. It
can be defined as a foreign currency with value that may be exchanged back and forth
with U.S. dollars but which requires clearing or settlement. A purchaser obtains funds
for use on the Internet by converting funds from a bank account or a credit card into an
electronic token for use on the internet. Robert F. Stankey, Internet Payment Systems:
Legal Issues Facing Businesses, Consumers and Payment Service Providers, 6
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 11, 22 (1998).
27
FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, REPORT ON NEW PAYMENT METHODS 9 (2006),
available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/30/47/37627240.pdf [hereinafter FATF
REPORT ON NEW PAYMENT METHODS].
28
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CTR., MONEY LAUNDERING IN
DIGITAL CURRENCIES 1 (2008), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs28/28675/28675p.pdf [hereinafter MONEY LAUNDERING
IN DIGITAL CURRENCIES].
29
Id. at 1-2.
30
See id. at 3 & n.8.
31
Id. at 3-4.
32
Id. at 1.
33
See supra note 14.
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Paypal is tied to a bank account or a credit card and is essentially a credit
card processing service.34 Most other services, such as e-gold, require the
user to load the account with money before one may “spend,” or transfer,
the digital currency to another account holder.35
[9] Those digital currencies not tied to a credit card or bank account must
make use of a money exchange service that accepts a national currency in
exchange for a digital currency.36 The digital currency provider itself may
provide this service, or it may prefer to leave the business of exchange to
others.37 Whether or not it provides this service itself may alter the legal
requirements and regulations to which it is subject.38 These differences
will be further discussed in Parts II and III.
B. POTENTIAL FOR UNDETECTABLE TRANSFERS, MONEY LAUNDERING,
FINANCING TERRORISM
[10] Digital currencies afford a mechanism for money launderers and
terrorists to transfer money internationally with a lower risk of detection
than transfers carried out through traditional banking channels.39
Regulations of financial institutions, such as “know your customer”
requirements and mandatory reporting for certain transactions, make the
detection of illegal transfers and associated criminal activity more
probable.40 U.S. officials hinted to reporters “that e-gold is a ‘PayPal’ for
terrorists to move cash stealthily among operatives.”41 Some digital
34

Brian Grow et al., Gold Rush: Online Payment Systems Like E-gold Ltd. Are Becoming
the Currency of Choice for Cybercrooks, BUS. WK., Jan. 9, 2006, at 68.
35
E-gold enables an individual “to spend gold as money” after opening an account by
wiring money to e-gold or depositing money from a bank accounts, credit cards, or a
money order. See e-gold, supra note 15.
36
See MONEY LAUNDERING IN DIGITAL CURRENCIES, supra note 28, at 2.
37
See id.
38
See infra Part II.B.
39
See Hinnen, supra note 2, at 27, 33-35.
40
See infra Part II, for a detailed discussion of these regulations. See Josh Meyer &
Erika Hayasaki, Bank Transactions Put Focus on Spitzer: Neither the New York
Governor nor the Call-Girl Ring He Has Been Linked to Was Specifically Targeted, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2008, at 16, for an example of how such regulations can uncover
criminal activity.
41
James Gordon Meek, 24-Karat Worry on the Web, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 3, 2007, at
2.
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currency providers allow users to maintain anonymous accounts.42 For
example, acquiring an e-gold account takes only minutes and includes no
verification procedure, unlike the process required by banks.43 In some
instances, all that is needed to load money onto an account is a long
distance phone card. 44 In addition, the existence of currency and e-gold
exchangers worldwide makes it difficult to find out which trader or
exchanger funded the account.45
[11] The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an intergovernmental
body composed of 34 member-states, compared digital currencies to
physical cash in order to assess the risk of digital value transfer systems.46
“Physical cash is often the ideal method of value transfer for criminal
activity because it is anonymous, untraceable, requires no intermediary, is
widely accepted, and provides for immediate settlement.”47 Therefore, a
value transfer system, such as digital currency, contains a higher risk of
being vulnerable to money laundering and terrorist financing activities the
more closely it resembles physical cash. Using cash is anonymous and
requires no verification, customer identification, or recordkeeping.48
Physical cash also has no limit to the amount that may be spent,49 apart
from the physical barrier of carrying a quantity of cash.50 Major
currencies, such as dollars and euros, have few geographic limitations, as
they can be exchanged worldwide, while others may have a narrower area
of acceptance.51
[12] Thus, those digital currencies that verify fewer aspects of one’s
identity present a higher risk of being used by money launderers and
terrorists, as they are more anonymous and more difficult to trace.52
42

FATF REPORT ON NEW PAYMENT METHODS, supra note 27, at 9.
Jeremy Au Yong, You Can Kiss Your Money Goodbye: Net Currency System Hides
Cheaters' Tracks As Users Are Anonymous and Payments Difficult to Track, STRAITS
TIMES (Sing.), Nov. 12, 2006.
44
Holahan, supra note 13.
45
Id.
46
FATF REPORT ON NEW PAYMENT METHODS, supra note 27, at 10.
47
Id. at 10 n.22.
48
Id. at 10-11 tbl.2.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 10 n.22.
51
FATF REPORT ON NEW PAYMENT METHODS, supra note 27, at 10.
52
See MONEY LAUNDERING IN DIGITAL CURRENCIES, supra note 28, at 3-4.
43
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Likewise, those digital currencies that have a lower threshold of customer
identification and verification and either severely limit or lack
recordkeeping also pose a higher risk.53 For example, e-gold has been
criticized for providing little or no verification of the identity of its users.54
Active accounts were discovered under the names “Bud Weiser” and
“Mickey Mouse,” indicating that no internal checks exist to verify who is
using the service.55
[13] In the context of money laundering or financing terrorism, digital
currencies provide a flexible and potentially undetectable method for
funds transfers.56 As long as both parties to the transfer of value have
accounts with the digital currency server, most digital currencies have no
limits to the amount of value that may be transferred.57 Further, there are
often fewer geographical limitations to the transfer of digital currencies,
because these currencies operate over the Internet.58 Individuals may
access their accounts and make transfers online from anywhere in the
world. In the context of terrorism the limit is on liquidity; it is often
difficult to convert digital funds into usable cash within the target country.
C. MECHANICS OF HOW DIGITAL CURRENCIES COULD FINANCE
TERRORISM
[14] Using a digital currency to finance a terror attack in the United States
or another target country would require several steps. Transferring
physical cash or funds from a bank account in one country, to cash or
usable funds in the United States, necessitates both a digital currency
dealer and a currency exchanger.59 Sometimes a digital currency provider
will perform both functions if it accepts wire transfers or credit cards in
order to directly fund an account.60 Other types of digital currencies, such
as e-gold, however, require the use of an independent currency or

53

Id.
See e-gold Indictment 3-4, supra note 19, at 12-13.
55
Meek, supra note 41.
56
See MONEY LAUNDERING IN DIGITAL CURRENCIES, supra note 28, at 4.
57
FATF REPORT ON NEW PAYMENT METHODS, supra note 27, at 9-10.
58
See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
59
FATF REPORT ON NEW PAYMENT METHODS, supra note 27, at 9.
60
See id.
54
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commodities exchanger.61 In these cases, one must pay the exchanger via
cash, check, credit card, or wire transfer, and the exchanger will then make
a “spend” from its digital currency account to the customer’s account.62
The digital currency provider itself, in such a situation, only deals in
exchanges of its own currency and does not deal with funds in any
national currency.
[15] Examining the mechanics of a transaction at a practical level, there
are at least several different methods through which one could transfer
funds using a digital currency. The first step would be to use a check,
credit card, wire transfer, cash or other value transfer to pay a currency
exchanger that trades in digital currencies. Such dealers, or exchangers,
operate in much the same way that traditional hard currency exchangers
operate. The exchanger accepts payment in cash (or check or wire
transfer) and for a fee, grants the customer a quantity of digital currency
through a “spend” from its own account to the customer’s.63 After
obtaining the digital currency, the individual is free to transfer it
anonymously online to someone else, who could be anywhere in the
world.
[16] The recipient may then use various methods to convert the digital
currency into usable money in the United States. First, the recipient could
use a currency exchanger to obtain hard currency in U.S. dollars.64 Such
exchangers in the United States, however, are subject to financial
regulations, so transfers would leave a paper trail and not be completely
anonymous. A second option would be to transfer the digital currency via
wire transfer to a bank in another country that has fewer banking
regulations and reporting requirements. Then, with an ATM card already
held from the foreign bank, the individual could make purchases and
obtain dollars in cash. This method, however, would also leave a trail, as
withdrawing funds in the United States would reveal at least the account
holder’s foreign bank, which is likely to have recorded customer
information and be subject to some regulation.

61

See infra text accompanying notes 122-123.
See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
63
Au Yong, supra note 43; id.
64
MONEY LAUNDERING IN DIGITAL CURRENCIES, supra note 28, at 2.
62
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[17] A third option would be to purchase cash cards, or gift cards, which
are prepaid cards that function like debit or ATM cards. Several
exchangers provide a service of accepting digital currencies and
exchanging them for a national currency loaded onto an ATM card.65
These cards are generally independent from banks or credit cards, even
though they may be associated with a card payment network such as
MasterCard or Visa.66 The only thing required to load money onto an
account in some cases is a long-distance phone card.67 A customer can opt
to receive a cash card via international courier and then withdraw or spend
the funds at any ATM or vendor that accepts MasterCard and Visa.68
Most such cards are reloadable.69 The most common digital currency
accepted by these service providers is e-gold.70 The level of regulation to
which these new entities are subject in their home countries is uncertain.
In one reported case, an individual purchased more than 300 prepaid cards
in order to launder $2 million from the United States to Colombia.71
[18] Digital currency exchangers that issue cash or debit cards appear to
require customers to provide only minimal personal information, such as
names, addresses, and phone numbers.72 The extent to which these
providers verify this information is unknown. In addition, although ATM
withdrawals leave an electronic trail, the cardholder and origin of the
funds may be untraceable if the card provider is not subject to U.S.
regulations or if what little information it has is forged or unverified.73
65

See, e.g., Cash Cards International, supra note 23; Express Cash Card,
https://www.exprescash.com/default.aspx (last visited Nov. 18, 2008); E-Forexgold,
https://www.e-forexgold.com/efx2/debit_cards (last visited Nov. 18, 2008); Digital
Wealth Global Debit Cards, http://www.dwgcard.com/index.php (last visited Nov. 18,
2008).
66
See FATF REPORT ON NEW PAYMENT METHODS, supra note 27, at 4.
67
Holahan, supra note 13.
68
FATF REPORT ON NEW PAYMENT METHODS, supra note 27, at 4.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 9.
71
Id. at 12.
72
See, e.g. GoldMoney, https://secure.goldmoney.com/user/opnhld.php (last visited Nov.
21, 2008); LibertyReserve, https://www.libertyreserve.com/en/signup/step1/index.aspx
(last visited Nov. 21, 2008); LutLot, http://www.lutlot.com/lutlot/user/user_register.php
(last visited Nov. 21, 2008); V-Cash, http://v-cash.com/rep/54165/create.html (last visited
Nov. 21, 2008); Webmoney, https://start.wmtransfer.com/signup.aspx?lang=en (last
visited Nov. 21, 2008).
73
See id. at 11.

11

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XV, Issue 2

Such “open-system, prepaid cards” as termed by a FATF report, contain a
higher risk for use in money laundering or terrorist-financed operations if
not mitigated by account or transactional limitations.74
[19] The providers of debit and cash cards loadable with e-gold or other
digital currencies are often incorporated in countries notorious for weak or
insufficient financial regulations. For example, Cash Cards International
is incorporated in St. Kitts,75 and E-Bullion Debit Cards and E-forexgold
are incorporated in Panama.76 FATF included St. Kitts on its list of NonCooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT) until 2002.77 Panama was
included as a NCCT until 2001.78 Although these countries have made
progress in financial regulations through recent lawmaking, downstream
enforcement of these stricter regulations for financial institutions remains
uncertain.
[20] The existence of these digital currency providers and exchangers
outside the United States presents a higher risk than traditional transfers
through bank accounts via wire transfers or ATM withdrawals. The
location of these providers means that it may be impossible for U.S. law
enforcement to access account information under circumstances that
would allow an administrative subpoena or search warrant within the
United States.79 Tracking the sources of funds channeled through digital
currencies and exchangers of these currencies is thus extremely difficult, if
not impossible.
[21] The challenges involved with digital currency providers and
exchangers located outside the United States are further discussed in Part
VI. The following section examines the current U.S. regulatory regime for
74

Id.
Cash Cards International, supra note 23.
76
Century City, CITY NEWS SERVICE (Los Angeles), July 30, 2008; E-Forexgold, supra
note 55.
77
FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, ANNUAL REVIEW OF NONCOOPERATIVE COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES 16 (2003), available at http://www.fatfgafi.org/dataoecd/4/30/33922392.PDF [hereinafter FATF ON MONEY LAUNDERING].
78
FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, REVIEW TO IDENTIFY NON-COOPERATIVE COUNTRIES
AND TERRITORIES: INCREASING THE WORLD-WIDE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING MEASURES 19 (2002), available at http://www.fatfgafi.org/dataoecd/4/32/33922320.pdf.
79
Crisco, supra note 24.
75
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financial institutions. It begins by discussing the overall goals of
regulation. It then briefly outlines the history of regulations in the United
States and discusses key elements of the regulatory regime.
II. DOMESTIC REGULATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND DIGITAL
CURRENCY PROVIDERS
A. GOALS OF FINANCIAL REGULATION
[22] One may wonder why digital currency transactions, even if more
anonymous than other transfers, present a greater threat to the security of
the United States and other target countries. After all, most wire transfers
and withdrawals from bank accounts in the United States that arouse
suspicion are not halted. They merely trigger reporting requirements.
Thus, the damage, if any, is already done with the act of the transfer itself.
But even if regulation of these traditional financial exchanges does not
always prevent the actual funds transfer, regulation also serves another
purpose: aiding investigations.
[23] One major goal of financial regulation is to detect and prevent the
financing of terrorism, which means preventing potential terrorists in the
United States (or other targeted countries) from obtaining physical cash or
any other method of funding that allows them to carry out attacks.80 Even
with a stricter regulation regime than is currently in place in the United
States, however, preventing all such transfers is likely to prove
impossible.81 Indeed, the stricter regulations now in place, such as those
requiring financial institutions to file Suspicious Activities Reports for a
wider variety of activity, would not be able to detect the financial transfers
that were made by the 9/11 hijackers.82 For this reason, regulation has a
“dual purpose,” including detection and prevention as well as aiding
investigation after the commission of a crime.83

80

Donohue, supra note 4, at 304-05.
See id. at 304.
82
Id. at 396.
83
Id. at 374.
81

13

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XV, Issue 2

B. U.S. REGULATION OF DIGITAL CURRENCY PROVIDERS AND
EXCHANGERS
[24] There is some ambiguity as to how digital currency providers, and
exchanges dealing in such currencies, fit into the U.S. regulatory scheme.
One source of confusion is that the relevant statutes and regulations
contain differing and sometimes conflicting definitions of key terms. For
example, 31 U.S.C. § 5312 defines “financial institution” differently than
the regulations at 31 C.F.R. § 103.11. The statute lists twenty-six
categories of “financial institutions,” while the regulations break them
down into nine categories. 84 In the case of digital currencies, the
differences in the definitions would not likely produce differing results.
That is, if a digital currency is a “financial institution” for the purposes of
the regulations, it is also likely to be a “financial institution” under the
statute. Both definitions include a category of any “person engaged as a
business,” in either the statutory “transmission of funds” 85 or regulatory
“transfer of funds.”86
84
85

31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2) (2006); 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(n) (2008).
The statutory definition of “financial institution” includes:
(R) a licensed sender of money or any other person who
engages as a business in the transmission of funds, including any
person who engages as a business in an informal money transfer system
or any network of people who engage as a business in facilitating the
transfer of money domestically or internationally outside of the
conventional financial institutions system.

31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)(R).
The regulatory definition of “financial institution” in 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(n) includes
the term “money services business,” which is defined as a:

86

(5) Money transmitter –
(i) In general. Money transmitter:
(A) Any person, whether or not licensed or required to be
licensed, who engages as a business in accepting currency, or funds
denominated in currency, and transmits the currency or funds, or the
value of the currency or funds, by any means through a financial
agency or institution, a Federal Reserve Bank or other facility of one or
more Federal Reserve Banks, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, or both, or an electronic funds transfer network; or
(B) Any other person engaged as a business in the transfer of
funds.
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[25] If digital currency providers are to be subject to the regulatory
regime, they must fall within the “money transmitter” category as “any
other person engaged . . . in the transfer of funds.”87 The regulations state
that the determination of whether an entity falls into the category of a
“money transmitter” will depend on the facts and circumstances.88 This
limitation also suggests that the mere acceptance or transfer of funds to
settle accounts pursuant to a transaction itself will not generally subject an
individual or entity to the regulations.89 Some have argued that this
limitation could be used as a defense by digital currency providers,90
although the meaning of the limitation in 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(uu)(5)(ii)
remains unclear as it has not yet been addressed by courts or regulatory
agencies.
[26] Assuming a digital currency provider qualifies as a “financial
institution,” various reporting and recording obligations apply. The Bank
Secrecy Act91 imposes several such obligations. In its own words, the
statute requires financial institutions to maintain “certain reports or
records where they have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or
regulatory investigations or proceedings, or in the conduct of intelligence
or counterintelligence activities, including analysis, to protect against
international terrorism.”92 The Act’s justification is rooted in the idea that
private industry, rather than government, is better able to detect illegal or
suspicious uses of financial institutions.93 The statute requires financial
institutions to maintain certain information regarding account owners,
fund sources, and whether transactions are consistent with customer
profiles.94

31 C.F.R. § 103.11(uu) (emphasis added).
87
31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)(R); 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.11(n)(3), (uu)(5)(i)(B).
88
31 C.F.R. § 103.11(uu)(5)(ii).
89
Id.
90
Sarah Jane Hughes et al., Developments in the Law Concerning Stored-Value Cards
and Other Electronic Payments Products, 63 BUS. LAW., 237, 262 (2007).
91
31 U.S.C. § 5311 (2006).
92
Id.
93
Donohue, supra note 4, at 356-57.
94
Id. at 357.
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[27] The USA PATRIOT Act, passed in October of 2001,95 imposes
further measures in an attempt to detect suspicious or illegal movements
of funds for the purpose of combating international terrorism.96 The Act
requires the U.S. Treasury Department to promulgate regulations with a
The USA
minimum level of customer identification measures.97
PATRIOT Act includes enhanced “know your customer” rules that require
financial institutions, at a minimum, to implement “reasonable
procedures” to verify the identity of those seeking to open accounts, and to
maintain records of information collected, including name, address, and
other identifying information.98 The USA PATRIOT Act also requires all
financial institutions to implement anti-money laundering programs.99
Regulations list requirements that specifically apply to “money services
businesses,” including among other things, procedures for verifying
customer identification, filing reports, creating and retaining records, and
responding to law enforcement requests.100
1. SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITIES REPORTS FOR MONEY SERVICES BUSINESSES
[28] As discussed above, if digital currency providers and exchangers are
to fall under the regulatory regime, it is in the “money services business”
category. Regulations require “money services businesses” to file a
suspicious activities report (SAR) with the U.S. Treasury Department for
any transaction involving aggregate funds of $2000 where the “money
services business” knows or has reason to know that the transaction
“involves funds derived from illegal activity”; “is designed to evade”
reporting requirements or other regulations; “serves no business or
apparent lawful purpose”; or “involves [the] use of the money services

95

Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.).
96
Robert M. Taylor, III, Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorist Financing
Requirements Applicable to Financial Institutions, 120 BANKING L.J. 497, 499 (2003).
97
31 U.S.C. § 5318 (2006).
98
Id. § 5318(l)(1)-(2); Taylor, supra note 96.
99
Id. § 5318(h)(1).
100
31 C.F.R. § 103.125(d)(1)(i) (2008).
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business to facilitate criminal activity.”101 The SAR must be filed within
thirty days of detecting the suspicious activity.102
2. RECORDKEEPING REQUIREMENTS FOR ALL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
[29] Regulations require all financial institutions to retain records for five
years when they are for certain transactions in excess of $10,000 including
records of advice, requests, or instruction in any transaction that results in,
or intends to result in, the transfer of currency or other monetary
instruments, funds, checks, investment securities, or credit, as well as fund
transfers that equal or exceed $3,000.103 “Additional record-keeping
requirements apply specifically to banks, securities brokers and dealers,
casinos, and currency dealers and exchangers.”104 The regulations require
non-bank financial institutions to retain records for transactions in the
amount of $3,000 or more.105 For each transfer, non-bank financial
institutions must record the following: the name and address of the
transmitter, the amount of the transfer, the date, the identity of the
recipient’s institution, and if available, the recipient’s name, address,
account number, and identifying information.106
[30] In addition, non-bank financial institutions with branches or agents
located in the United States must retain further information for
transactions in the amount of $3,000 or more conducted by individuals
who are anyone other than “established customers.”107 Regulations define
an “established customer” as a person with an account for which the
financial institution maintains a file on the name, address, and taxpayer
identification number (social security number, alien registration number,
or passport number and country of issuance).108 If a person is not an
“established customer,” the regulations require that the financial
101

Id. § 103.20(a)(2)(i)-(iv).
Id. § 103.20(b)(3).
103
Id. § 103.33(a)-(d); see also Andrew Chung & John Mack, Financial Institutions
Fraud, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 555, 585-86 (2007) (discussing the record-keeping
requirements under the Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (2006)).
104
Chung & Mack, supra note 103, at 586.
105
31 C.F.R. § 103.33(f).
106
Id. § 103.33(f)(1)(i).
107
Id. § 103.33(f)(2).
108
Id. § 103.11(l).
102
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institution collect and record this information before carrying out the
transfer.109
3. ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR MONEY SERVICES BUSINESSES
[31] The regulations further specify requirements for money services
businesses. 110 Financial institutions in this category, which likely include
many digital currency providers and exchangers, must initially register
with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) of the
Treasury Department and renew the registration every two years.111 Each
money services business must also submit a list of its agents, as required
by 31 U.S.C. § 5330.112 This is in addition to the obligations of all
financial institutions, such as the “know your customer” requirements and
those which require institutions to maintain additional records of
identifying information for accounts involving transactions of $3,000 or
more.113
[32] The jurisdictional requirement that the financial institution, or its
offices, branches, or agents be located in the United States limits the reach
and effectiveness of the regulations, especially in the context of digital
currency providers.114 As noted above, many such businesses are
specifically located in foreign locales that lack stringent recordkeeping
requirements. A customer in the United States can conduct transactions
online through exchangers who deal in digital currencies, completely
avoiding the recording of account or transactional information, and thus
remaining anonymous.115 Even with a wire transfer into a U.S. bank or an
ATM withdrawal within the United States, the trail of the funds’ source
quickly dries up at the foreign digital currency exchanger’s doorstep.
109

Id. § 103.33(f)(2)-(3).
See generally id. § 103.41 (2008) (discussing registration requirements for money
services businesses).
111
Id. § 103.41(b)(1)-(2).
112
Id. § 103.41(a)(1).
113
See id. § 103.33 (e); see also Donohue, supra note 4, at 357 (discussing how the
statute minimizes exposure to risk by requiring banks to “know” their customers).
114
31 C.F.R. § 103.33(e).
115
See generally Hinnen, supra note 2, at 1, 4-9 (explaining how the Internet can be used
to make anonymous transactions); MONEY LAUNDERING IN DIGITAL CURRENCIES, supra
note 28.
110
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4. PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS AND
REGULATIONS
[33] For those subject to U.S. jurisdiction, violations of the statutory or
regulatory reporting requirements are punishable by either a maximum
five-year imprisonment or a maximum $250,000 fine, or both.116 In
addition, such violations are also chargeable offenses under the federal
prong of the unlicensed money transmitting business statute, 18 U.S.C. §
1960.117 The statute defines “unlicensed money transmitting business” in
three ways: (A) operation of a money transmitting business without a state
license where the state requires it;118 (B) failure to comply with the money
transmitting business registration requirements under 31 U.S.C. § 5330 or
the accompanying regulations;119 or (C) transmitting funds knowing that
they are derived from a criminal offense or are intended to promote
unlawful activity.120 The Code carries a maximum punishment of a fiveyear imprisonment.121
[34] In order to be subject to prosecution under the federal licensing
prong of 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1)(B), a digital currency provider or
exchanger is subject to the registration requirements of 31 U.S.C. § 5330
if it qualifies as a “money transmitting business,” which is any business
providing currency exchange, money transmitting services, or anyone who
“engages as a business in the transmission of funds.”122 Thus, the
language tracks the definition of a “money services business,” defined by
31 C.F.R. §103.11(n) and (uu). If a digital currency provider or exchanger
falls into this category, then failure to register with the U.S. Treasury

116

31 U.S.C. § 5322(a) (2006).
John D.G. Waszak, The Obstacles to Suppressing Radical Islamic Terrorist
Financing, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 673, 686 (2005). See generally Courtney J. Linn,
One-Hour Money Laundering: Prosecuting Unlicensed Money Transmitting Businesses
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1960, 8 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 138 (2007).
118
18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1)(A) (2006). The constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1)(A)
was called into question in United States v. Barre, 313 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1090-91 (D.
Colo. 2004).
119
18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1)(B).
120
Id. § 1960(b)(1)(C).
121
Id. § 1960(a).
122
31 U.S.C. § 5330(d)(1)(A) (2006).
117
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Department appears to be a chargeable offense for an unlicensed money
transmitting business.123
III. APPLICATION OF REGULATIONS TO DIGITAL CURRENCY PROVIDERS,
CURRENCY EXCHANGERS
[35] The U.S. Justice Department is exploring the bounds of enforcing
this statutory and regulatory regime, evidenced by its bringing charges
against at least one digital currency provider.124 Those in charge of
operating the digital currency provider e-gold have recently come under
increased scrutiny.125 To date, this is the only digital currency provider or
exchanger to face serious forfeitures and criminal charges. The e-gold
case serves as an example of how the government interprets the
regulations (in light of their statutory basis) and who is subject to them.126
In addition, it brings certain defenses to light that defendants are likely to
raise in such cases. This section uses the e-gold example as a case study
to better understand how the United States will seek to enforce the
regulations against digital currency providers and exchangers.
A. VIOLATIONS OF REGULATIONS, PROSECUTIONS OF DIGITAL CURRENCY
PROVIDERS, E-GOLD CASE
[36] On April 24, 2007, e-gold, Ltd., Gold & Silver Reserve, Inc. and
founders Dr. Douglas L. Jackson, Reid A. Jackson, and Barry K. Downey
were indicted for money laundering, conspiracy, and operating an
unlicensed money transmitting business.127 On July 21, 2008, the U.S.
Department of Justice announced that each defendant pleaded guilty to

123

See id. § 5312(a)(2)(R) (stating that “any other person who engages as a business in
the transmission of funds” may qualify as a financial institution); see 31 C.F.R. §§
103.11(uu)(5)(i)(A)-(B) (2008).
124
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Digital Currency Business E-Gold Indicted for
Money Laundering and Illegal Money Transmitting (Apr. 27, 2007), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/April/07_crm_301.html.
125
E-gold Indictment, supra note 19, at 1-2.
126
See generally id. (describing the elements of the charges brought against e-gold).
127
E-gold Indictment, supra note 19, at 16; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra
note 124.
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one or more of the charges.128 The discussion in this article focuses on the
charge of operating an unlicensed money transmitting business under
federal law, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1960. The statute criminalizes
operation of a money transmitting business without a license (in
jurisdictions where state law requires a license) and operation without
proper federal registration.129 The e-gold indictment contains counts
alleging violations of both the state and federal licensing prongs.130
[37] The general elements of the offense under the state licensing prong
are: 1) operation of a money transmitting business; 2) that affects
interstate or foreign commerce; 3) that is unlicensed under state law; 4)
operating in a state that requires a license for such operation; 5) where the
state punishes such unlicensed operation.131 Under the federal prong, the
statute requires the same two first elements, and also requires that the
operation fail to comply with the registration requirements under 31
U.S.C. § 5330 or the accompanying regulations,132 or involves the
transmission of funds “that are known to the defendant to have been
derived from a criminal offense or are intended to be used to promote or
support unlawful activity.”133
[38] For an understanding of the e-gold case, it is necessary to understand
the distinction between a digital currency provider and a digital currency
exchanger. The digital currency provider maintains the online currency
system and handles transactions between accounts online.134 The digital
currency exchanger accepts national currencies and multiple payment
methods and issues users a quantity of the digital currency, usually for an
exchange fee.135 In practice, however, these roles sometimes overlap, as
in the case of the e-gold defendants. The e-gold digital currency provider

128

Digital Currency Business E-gold Pleads Guilty to Money Laundering and Illegal
Money Transmitting Charges, U.S. FED. NEWS, July 21, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR
13724535.
129
18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(A)-(C) (2006).
130
E-gold Indictment, supra note 19, at 25-26.
131
U.S. v. Talebnejad, 460 F.3d 563 (4th Cir. 2006).
132
18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1)(B).
133
Id. § 1960(b)(1)(C).
134
MONEY LAUNDERING IN DIGITAL CURRENCIES, supra note 28, at 2.
135
Id.
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is e-gold, Ltd., incorporated in Nevis,136 which handles the “roles of
issuance and settlement.”137 The e-gold system makes use of independent
currency exchangers, although the parent corporation Gold & Silver
Reserve, Inc., a Delaware corporation headquartered in Melbourne,
Florida,138 also operates its own currency exchange called OmniPay,
described as “the primary source for e-gold exchange.”139 OmniPay is not
currently operational after the 2007 indictment; its website indicates its
intent to suspend new account registrations until it has complied with
applicable federal and state regulations.140
[39] Gold & Silver Reserve was in exclusive control of the e-gold digital
currency system from 1996 through 1999.141 In January of 2000,
however, the issuance and settlement roles were transferred to e-gold, Ltd.
in order “to further assure e-gold’s freedom from default risk and finality
of settlement by dissociating the e-gold Issuer from business risks relating
to exchange.”142 This was also likely a strategic move in an attempt to
avoid becoming subject to the regulatory regime of financial institutions in
the United States.
[40] E-gold, Ltd. now operates the digital currency system, whereby
accountholders may exchange values with each other, measured in weights
of gold.143 The system purportedly holds a fixed quantity of gold bullion
at storage repositories “certified by the London Bullion Market
Association,”144 and the user agreement states that e-gold “is payable to
User, fine gram for gram, on demand, in physical gold.”145 Title to the
gold bullion is held in trust by e-gold Bullion Reserve Special Purpose
Trust, and the bullion may not be liquidated without the signatures of both
136

Nevis is located in the Caribbean Sea, near the island of Saint Kitts. See
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sc.html.
137
OmniPay, About Us, http://www.omnipay.com/aboutus.asp (last visited Nov. 18,
2008).
138
Id.
139
OmniPay, https://www.omnipay.com/default.asp (last visited Nov. 18, 2008).
140
OmniPay, http://www.omnipay.com/opa2007.asp (last visited Nov. 18, 2008).
141
See OmniPay, About Us, supra note 137.
142
Id.
143
E-gold, supra note 15.
144
Id.
145
E-gold Account User Agreement § 3.1.1, http://www.e-gold.com/unsecure/e-gagree.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2008).
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e-gold, Ltd. and a third party escrow agent.146 Account holders “spend” egold by transferring values to other account holders through transactions
ordered online.147 These transactions are irreversible.148 The e-gold
website states that e-gold, Ltd.. does not possess any national currency or
bank account.149 Yet, to recover bullion storage costs, e-gold apparently
charges “Agio fees” and “spend fees”; the latter are deducted in e-metal.150
It is unclear how e-gold extracts this fee to pay the bullion storage facility
if it does not maintain bank accounts.
[41] Transferring a national currency through e-gold to another party is at
least a three step process. First, one must pay a currency exchanger that
accepts e-gold a quantity of national currency, or other digital currency.151
As mentioned above, Gold & Silver Reserve’s exchanger, OmniPay,
offered these services up until the indictment.152 Currently, any exchange
must be carried out by independent exchangers.153 Second, the exchanger
accepts a national currency, or other transfer of value, and issues the
customer an equivalent in e-gold, minus a transactional fee.154 The
exchanger affects this transfer by issuing a “spend”155 from its e-gold
account to the account of the customer. Third, the customer is then free to
transfer the e-gold as he or she sees fit to another account holder.156 This
account holder may make further transfers, or could issue a “spend” to the
146

Defendants’ Motion to Vacate Seizure Warrant and to Modify Restraining Order and
Request for an Evidentiary Hearing at 20, n.19, United States v. E-gold, Ltd., 550 F.
Supp. 2d 82 (D.D.C. May 17, 2007) (No. 07-109) (citing to e-gold Bullion Reserve
Special Purpose Trust ¶ 4.1, available at http://www.e-gold.com/contracts/egold-spt111899.htm).
147
E-gold Account User Agreement, supra note 145, § 1.12.
148
Id. § 2.5.1.
149
E-gold, supra note 15.
150
See E-gold Account User Agreement, supra note 145, § 4.3.
151
See, e.g., http://www.asianagold.com/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2008).
152
See OmniPay, About Us, supra note 137 (“OutExchange” service exchanges e-metal
for National currency).
153
See e-gold, supra note 15.
154
See generally id. (referencing outside, independent exchange services which support
the exchange of national currencies and e-gold).
155
A “spend” is “the act of transferring value between gold accounts in fulfillment of a
payment order entered by User.” E-gold Account User Agreement, supra note 145, §
1.12. A spend is based on the weight of e-gold and title is conveyed for the specific fine
weight of metal, and is limited to the available balance. Id.
156
See e-gold, supra note 15.
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account of another currency exchanger that accepts e-gold in order to
receive funds in a national currency.157
[42] Under the criminal charges against e-gold, the government alleged
that e-gold, Ltd., Gold & Silver Reserve, Inc., and OmniPay together
offered a payment processing service that constituted a money
transmitting business in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1960.158 The indictment
alleged that Gold & Silver Reserve, Inc. maintained bank accounts that
accepted and transmitted wire transfers totaling millions of dollars, for the
purpose of providing a digital currency exchange service.159 It also
alleged that OmniPay collected exchange fees from customers, in return
for issuing quantities of e-gold.160
[43] E-gold and its co-defendants made several arguments in defense,
contending that their operation did not consist of a “money transmitting
business” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1960.161 First, the e-gold defendants
argued that to be a “money transmitting business,” they must have
engaged in cash transactions.162 Since they did not accept hard currency
or cash, they could not be a “money transmitting business.”163
[44] A violation of the federal registration requirement under 18 U.S.C. §
1960(b)(1)(B) requires failure to “comply with the money transmitting
business registration requirements under Section 5330 of Title 31 of the
United States Code, or regulations prescribed under such section.”164
Thus, the e-gold defendants turned to the registration requirements of 31
U.S.C. § 5330, requiring a “money transmitting business” to register with
the U.S. Treasury Department.165 The definition of “money transmitting
business” contains three subsections: (A), (B), and (C), which are listed in
157

See id.
E-gold Indictment, supra note 19, at 19.
159
Id. at 22.
160
Id. at 20.
161
Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 21, at
5-9.
162
See id. at 5-7.
163
See id. at 8-9.
164
18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1)(B) (2006).
165
See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note
21, at 5.
158
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the conjunctive.166 Subsection (B) mentions that the business must be
required to file reports under 31 U.S.C. § 5313.167 This statute, in turn,
requires the filing of reports for transactions involving U.S. coins or
currency.168 Therefore, the e-gold defendants argued that a business is
only a “money transmitting business” when it engages in transactions of
coins or currency and is consequently subject to the reporting
requirements of 31 U.S.C. § 5313.169
[45] Alternatively, the e-gold defendants argued that the criminal statute
was unconstitutionally vague.170 Although the statute requires that a
defendant be subject to reporting under 31 U.S.C. § 5313, which requires a
defendant to engage in currency transactions, 18 U.S.C. § 1960 defines
“money transmitting” differently. “Money transmitting,” according to the
definition in 18 U.S.C. § 1960, includes transfers by wire, check, draft,
fax, or courier.171 Because of the ambiguity of whether the definition of
“money transmitting” in 18 U.S.C. § 1960 controls over the definition of
“money transmitting business” in 31 U.S.C. § 5330, the statute is
unconstitutionally vague.172
[46] These arguments were unlikely to succeed if the prosecution had
progressed to trial. The statute, on its face, seems to reach conduct that
includes facilitating transfers involving not only cash but other transfers as
well. It defines a “money transmitter” to include transfers of funds “on
behalf of the public by any and all means including but not limited to
transfers within this country or to locations abroad by wire, check, draft,
facsimile, or courier.”173 The government took the position that because
of this definition, the statute makes clear that it includes conduct beyond

166

31 U.S.C. § 5330(d)(1)(A)-(C) (2006).
Id. § 5330(d)(1)(B).
168
Id. § 5313(a).
169
See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note
21, at 8.
170
See id. at 9-11.
171
18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(2) (2006).
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Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 21, at
10-11.
173
See 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(2).
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cash transactions.174 It contended that the statute, on its face, is clear on
the conduct proscribed and that it would be improper to import the
meaning in 31 U.S.C. § 5330.175 This argument makes more sense, as
Congress would not have included the broad types of transfers listed in 18
U.S.C. § 1960(b)(2) if it intended the offense to be limited to the definition
in 31 U.S.C. § 5330.
[47] The strongest argument against the e-gold defendant’s position is
that 18 U.S.C. § 1960 does not limit the offense to failure to comply with
the registration requirements of solely the statute, 31 U.S.C. § 5330.
Violations may also include failure to register as required by “the
regulations prescribed under such section.”176 This inclusion effectively
torpedoes the e-gold defendants’ argument that a “money transmitting
business” must engage in cash transactions. The regulations implementing
31 U.S.C. § 5330 clearly require registration of businesses that engage in
all types of funds transfers, not just those transacting in cash.177 The
regulations specifically state that “money services businesses” must
register with the Department of the Treasury.178 “Money services
businesses” are defined in 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(uu) to include:
(5) Money transmitter –
(i) In general. Money transmitter:
(A) Any person, whether or not licensed or required
to be licensed, who engages as a business in accepting
currency, or funds denominated in currency, and transmits
the currency or funds, or the value of the currency or funds,
by any means . . . ; or
(B) Any other person engaged as a business in the
transfer of funds.179
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[48] The e-gold operation likely satisfies 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(uu)(5)(i)(A),
as OmniPay accepted “funds denominated in currency” through wire and
bank transfers in order to fund customers’ e-gold accounts, and exchanged
out e-gold currency through such electronic transfers. Even if the e-gold
operation does not satisfy subsection 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(uu)(5)(i)(A), it
almost certainly satisfies the broader subsection 31 C.F.R. §
103.11(uu)(5)(i)(B), which includes “any other person engaged as a
business in the transfer of funds.”180 In either case, if the e-gold operation
falls within the definition of a “money services business,” the regulations
require that it register.181 It is difficult to conclude that the failure to
register under the regulations does not subject it to liability under 18
U.S.C. § 1960.
[49] Interestingly, the e-gold defendants never argued that they were not a
“money services business” under the regulations.
Instead, they
strategically chose to stay away from any discussion of the regulations,
relying entirely on the argument that the elements of “unlicensed” and
“money transmitting business” must be separate, and that defining “money
transmitting business” must be uniform throughout the statute without
regard to the three “unlicensed” prongs under Section 1960(b)(1).182 The
180

Id. § 103.11(uu)(5)(i)(A)-(B).
See id. § 103.41(a)(1).
182
Defendants’ Reply to the Government’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Counts Two, Three and Four of the Indictment at 5-6, United States v. E-gold, Ltd., et al.,
550 F. Supp. 2d 82 (D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2008) (No. 07-109). The statute reads:
(b) As used in this section—
(1) the term “unlicensed money transmitting
business” means a money transmitting business which affects
interstate or foreign commerce in any manner or degree and—
(A) is operated without an appropriate
money transmitting license in a State where such
operation is punishable as a misdemeanor or a felony
under State law, whether or not the defendant knew
that the operation was required to be licensed or that
the operation was so punishable;
(B) fails to comply with the money
transmitting business registration requirements under
section 5330 of title 31, United States Code, or
regulations prescribed under such section; or
(C) otherwise involves the transportation or
transmission of funds that are known to the defendant
181
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defendants argue in the alternative regarding the definition of “money
transmitting business”: it is either the case that the appropriate definition
of “money transmitting business” is the one provided by 31 U.S.C. § 5330
(including a requirement that the business engage in cash transactions), or
that this criminal statute is so vague as to void it in its entirety.183
B. IMPLICATIONS OF THE E-GOLD CASE FOR FUTURE PROSECUTIONS
[50] E-gold’s indictment and prosecution helped frame the bounds of the
U.S. regulatory regime of digital currency providers and digital currency
exchangers. The e-gold case was unique in several ways. First, the same
entity combined the roles of digital currency provider and currency
exchanger. Gold & Silver Reserve was essentially in control of both
OmniPay and e-gold, Ltd., although e-gold, Ltd. operated with some
independence.184 Second, these entities and the founders were all subject
to U.S. jurisdiction.185 E-gold, Ltd., although incorporated in Nevis,
apparently had records and files located at codefendant Dr. Jackson’s
home in Melbourne, Florida.186 In addition, the e-gold website states that
Gold & Silver Reserve serves as the “operator” of the e-gold system.187
With Gold & Silver Reserve as a Delaware corporation headquartered in
the United States, this would bring at least some of e-gold, Ltd.’s
operations within U.S. jurisdiction. Third, the government included the
charge of conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, bringing the roles of

to have been derived from a criminal offense or are
intended to be used to promote or support unlawful
activity.
18 U.S.C. § 1960(b) (2006) (highlighting the E-gold defendants’ argument that the
“money transmitting business” prong must be decided independently of the “unlicensed”
prong) (emphasis added).
183
Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 21, at
1, 6-11.
184
E-gold Indictment, supra note 19, at 6.
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See id. at 18-25.
186
Meek, supra note 41.
187
E-gold, Corporate History, http://www.e-gold.com/unsecure/aboutusdetail.html (last
visited Nov. 19, 2008).
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the digital currency provider, currency exchanger, and administration of
each, under one criminal enterprise.188
[51] Conspiracy seemed to be a key component in the government’s case
against the founders. If each codefendant had a role independent of the
other, and the digital currency provider in e-gold, Ltd. was in fact distinct
from Gold & Silver Reserve, perhaps there could be no complete
“business” as required by the statute. The statute’s language, however,
may still allow prosecution of the offense even where an entity does not
constitute the entire “business.” The first clause in 18 U.S.C. § 1960
includes the language, “[w]hoever knowingly conducts, controls,
manages, supervises, directs, or owns all or part of an unlicensed money
transmitting business.”189 This indicates that even an individual or entity
that conducts and has knowledge of only part of the “money transmitting
business” could be prosecuted under the statute. It is not yet clear how far
this will extend, but the potential liability is broad. For example, is the egold employee in charge of managing its information technology
department (as small or large as it may be) also liable for managing part of
an unlicensed transmitting business? The few courts considering the issue
have held that the offense is a general intent crime, requiring only that the
defendant have knowledge as to the conduct of the factual elements, not
knowledge of the reporting requirements or the offense.190 Construed
broadly, this means that those who direct, manage, or supervise only part
of an operation that later, combined with another entity, becomes a money
transmitting business, may be subject to criminal liability under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1960.
[52] As for the e-gold prosecution, the government’s theory was that egold, Ltd., OmniPay, and Gold & Silver Reserve conspired to form a
jointly run “money transmitting business.”191 The defendants may have
attempted to insulate themselves by separating the digital currency
provider, e-gold, Ltd., from the rest of the operation. If they could
sufficiently separate the digital currency provider from the exchanger, they
188

E-gold Indictment, supra note 19, at 18-25.
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190
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could argue either that the operation as a whole did not constitute a
“business” as required by the statute, or that they did not have knowledge
that one piece or the other was unlicensed. The problem for the
defendants is that Gold & Silver Reserve still operated parts of the e-gold
currency transactional operations, and, therefore, the separation was
incomplete.192
[53] Because of this problem, it was more difficult for the defendants to
make the argument that e-gold, Ltd. did not know that Gold & Silver
Reserve was unlicensed, or vice versa. In addition, the government
brought forward an alternative theory in the indictment.193 It alleged that
the e-gold operation “did not require other individuals or entities offering
‘e-gold’ exchange services to be licensed or registered as a money
transmitting business, nor did it concern itself with the policies and
practices of those exchangers related to the acceptance of cash or other
funds, or the true identification of the exchangers’ customers.”194 If the egold operation knew that the exchangers with whom it dealt were
unlicensed, then this may fulfill the general intent requirement of
“knowingly” conducting “part of an unlicensed money transmitting
business.”195 The government would still have to prove that e-gold had
knowledge that its services satisfied the factual elements of a “money
transmitting business.” Even if e-gold, Ltd. itself were not required to
register, a showing that it knew the exchangers were themselves
unlicensed may satisfy this element.
[54] There is some evidence in the regulations to suggest that a digital
currency provider, particularly one tied to a commodity such as a precious
metal, may fall under exceptions to the registration, reporting, and
recording requirements.196 The catch-all provision of the regulations,
which subjects a person or entity to the registration requirement, and
defines “money transmitter” as “any other person engaged as a business in
the transfer of funds,” is limited by the “facts and circumstances” of each
case.197 The regulations state that “the acceptance and transmission of
192
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funds as an integral part of the execution and settlement of a transaction
other than the funds transmission itself . . . will not cause a person to be a
money transmitter.”198 This could be interpreted to mean that an entity
operating only as a commodity exchange mechanism, transmitting funds
only for the purposes of settling accounts, is not a “money transmitter”
and thus not subject to the registration requirement.199
[55] Thus, it might be possible for one to maintain a digital currency
provider independently, without offering exchange services, without being
subject to the regulations. If the digital currency provider itself is not
“engaged in the business” of transmitting funds as defined in the
regulations, it would not be subject to criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. §
1960.200 For example, e-gold, Ltd. itself would have an argument that
since it only charges enough to maintain storage of the gold bullion, it is
not actually in the “business” of transmitting funds.201 Alternatively, it is
unclear that liability would ensue for e-gold, Ltd. if the currency provider
was entirely outside United States jurisdiction, and therefore not subject to
reporting requirements. Successful prosecution in such a case would have
to prove that e-gold, Ltd. knew that the foreign entity was “engaged in the
business” of transmitting funds.202 Also in question in such a case would
be the knowledge of the “unlicensed” element.203 If the foreign digital
currency exchanger is not subject to the United States’ jurisdiction, then it
has no obligation to be licensed under law. The question becomes
whether it would be enough for the government to prove that the digital
currency provider had knowledge of the factual elements that are required
for an entity to be considered a “money transmitting business,” and that its
own part of this overall business was unlicensed.204 Perhaps it could be a
defense that a digital currency provider subject to United States
jurisdiction reasonably believed that the exchangers with whom it was
doing business fulfilled legal registration requirements in their own
jurisdictions.
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[56] As United States regulations become more stringent and prosecutions
more prevalent for digital currency providers and exchangers, it is
inevitable that these entities will move, in whole or in part, to locations
abroad with less regulation.205 In this process, several questions arise
regarding the United States’ ability to protect against the transmission of
funds in support of criminal activity: To what extent are digital currency
providers and exchangers subject to United States jurisdiction if they are
located outside the United States, but have individuals within the United
States using their services online? In addition, what kind of international
regulations and agreements exist to address these new methods of
transmitting funds? The next section examines the international nature of
these entities and how they challenge jurisdictional limitations of financial
regulations.
IV. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
[57] An international focus on financial regulation, specifically on
terrorist finance, has begun only recently.206 The International Convention
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, signed in 2000, made it
an offense to provide or collect funds with the knowledge that they would
be used to finance terrorist acts.207 The Convention also imposed “know
your customer” and suspicious activities reporting requirements,208 and
has been ratified by 150 countries.209
[58] The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), created at the G7 Paris
summit in 1989, has been one of the most active international groups in
discussing and implementing measures designed to inhibit terrorist
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financing.210 FATF was originally designed to serve as a tool to combat
international money laundering.211 Its mandate was later expanded to
include creating standards to fight the financing of terrorism. In 1990,
FATF issued forty recommendations to combat money laundering, with
updates occurring in 1996 and again in 2003.212 One result was the
creation of the Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories List (NCCT),
which identifies those countries that fail to meet the regulations advanced
by FATF.213 The forty recommendations involve increased customer due
diligence and recordkeeping, and reporting of suspicious transactions.214
Additionally, FATF issued nine special recommendations to combat the
financing of terrorism, expand suspicious activities reporting, and require
the licensing of alternative remittance systems or any entity that provides a
service of transmitting funds or value.215 Although neither the forty
recommendations nor the subsequent nine recommendations directly
address digital currencies, in 2006, FATF conducted a study and issued a
report on new payment systems, including different forms of digital
currencies.216
[59] While none of the FATF recommendations are binding, the creation
of the NCCT has been effective in pressuring countries to impose more
stringent financial regulations. For example, the initiative began listing
countries as non-cooperative in 2000. In reviewing 47 countries, 23 were
listed as non-cooperative.217 As of October of 2006, no countries
remained on the list, although the initiative continues to monitor
210
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progress.218 Despite these efforts and successes in persuading countries to
enact stricter regulations, the porous nature of the Internet and electronic
communications still presents enormous challenges to combating the
financing of terrorism. The Internet, by its own nature, defies regulations
that are confined to a geographic nation-state; individuals can access
websites from anywhere in the world, thereby making effective regulation
difficult.219
[60] As the United States continues to transition from legislation and
regulations designed to combat money laundering to a regime that also
effectively combats terrorist financing, there are two main areas of focus.
First, the United States must examine its regulations of digital currency
providers and currency exchangers that are located in the United States, or
subject to its jurisdiction. Second, it must focus on what it can do to
prevent the use of digital currency providers located abroad to transfer
funds that can be accessed and spent within the U.S. to carry out terrorist
operations. The following section discusses current U.S. regulations of
digital currency providers and exchangers, offering suggestions to bolster
this regime and lower the risks posed by digital currency transactions.
Part VI follows with a discussion on what the U.S. can do to mitigate the
risks posed by those digital currency providers and exchangers located
outside its jurisdiction.
V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO LOWER THE RISKS OF DIGITAL
CURRENCIES
A. MEASURES TO LOWER THE RISK OF DOMESTIC CURRENCY
PROVIDERS/EXCHANGERS
[61] In order to implement sufficient domestic financial regulations it is
useful to analyze the risk posed by digital currencies by analogizing to
cash transactions.220 Those engaged in illegal activity prefer to use cash
when possible because it is “anonymous, untraceable, requires no
intermediary, is widely accepted, and provides for immediate
218
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settlement.”221 In a 2006 report, FATF identified characteristics of digital
currencies that increase the risk that such currencies will be used to
finance terror operations.222 Digital currencies pose a higher risk where
they (1) afford a higher level of anonymity; (2) have no limit on the
transaction size; (3) leave no traceable record; (4) have a wide range of
funding methods; (5) have no geographical limit; and (6) have no limit to
what they may purchase, or no limit on their transferability to hard cash.223
Regulations should be aimed at reducing or eliminating each of these
risks.224
[62] First, the regulations should specifically apply to digital currency
providers. As discussed above in Part III.B., a digital currency provider
that does not offer exchange services currently may fall under an
exception to the regulations and escape registration, record-keeping, and
reporting requirements.225 Under the definition of “money transmitter” in
31 C.F.R. § 103.11(uu), the regulations suggest that acceptance and
transmission of funds to settle an account, in connection with the sale of a
commodity or other instrument of value, alone will not cause one to be a
“money transmitter.”226 To eliminate this possible loophole for digital
currency providers, the regulations should specifically include them in the
definition of a “money transmitter.” This could be accomplished by
broadly defining “money transmitter” to include, for example, “any person
engaged in maintaining an online funds transfer system.” If the Treasury
Department desired to exempt certain businesses, such as those connected
with securities or other property, it could specifically list these types of
businesses as exempt. In addition, retaining the language, “engages in the
business” for this category provides another loophole for companies like
e-gold, Ltd., which claims it does not operate for profit, but merely
charges a small exchange fee for the purposes of covering the bullion
storage costs. Eliminating the “engages in the business” requirement from
the digital currency provider category would ensure coverage of these
entities.
221
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[63] After making all digital currency providers subject to the regulations,
one can consider whether the current identification and verification
requirements are sufficient for the “money services business” category.
Currently, “money services businesses” must implement minimum
procedures for verifying the identities of all customers.227 The regulations
provide more specific guidelines for transactions of $3,000 or more.228
Non-bank financial institutions must record the name and address of the
transmitter, the date and amount of the transfer, identity of the recipient’s
institution, and the recipient’s name, address, account number, and
taxpayer number (such as social security number, or passport number).229
Although the regulations outline strict recording requirements for
transactions of $3,000 or more,230 they are vague as to the customer
verification required for lesser transactions.231 It would be better to
specifically define what information is required for all customers, such as
providing name, address, and phone number, and requiring the money
services business to verify the information by contacting the customer
through one of these means. Regulations should also require money
services businesses to maintain records of the information in addition to
verifying it, to ensure its availability for possible investigations.
[64] Customers are currently limited as to the amounts transferred from
one U.S. digital currency account to another based on the information they
must furnish for transactions of $3,000 or more.232 Regulations could
further lower the risk posed by digital currency transactions by placing
limits on the methods used to convert the digital currencies to cash, such
as on the issuance of cash cards by currency exchangers, or on wire
transfers cashing out digital currency accounts. Use of a check or wire
transfer would route the transaction through a bank, and thus, trigger the
regulations required of banks.233 The use of a cash card, however, would
not, as the entity in charge of issuing the card is responsible for setting the
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limits to its use.234 For any exchange using a cash card, regulations should
require the recording of the same information as for transactions of $3,000
or more, making it more difficult for individuals to remain anonymous.
[65] Another possibility would be to place a value limit on cash cards,
and per day and per year limits on spending, as well limits on the number
of such cards an individual may purchase. For example, the EU has
implemented regulations exempting issuers of cash cards from due
diligence requirements, as long as those cards abide by certain value
limitations.235 A card issuer need not take measures to identify customers
purchasing non-rechargeable cards of 150 Euros or less, or rechargeable
cards with a yearly charging limit of 2,500 Euros and a yearly spending
limit of 1,000 Euros.236
[66] Europe’s limits on cash cards do not consider the source of the
electronic money loaded on the card.237 The threshold limits, below which
the issuer is exempt from due diligence requirements, seem to be designed
more for gift card applications. For example, a store that issues such
cards, redeemable only at its own stores, would not want to be burdened
with collecting identifying information for each card sold. The risk of
illegal use is also lower for these limited-use cards.238 Unfortunately,
Europe’s exemption would also apply to cash cards issued by a currency
exchanger that redeems digital currencies. These cards are higher risk
because they can be loaded online and redeemed at any ATM.239 Thus,
they should be subject to more stringent regulations and they should not be
exempt from due diligence requirements.
[67] The goal of regulating digital currency providers and exchangers is
to set limits that allow customers the freedom to utilize new, innovative
methods of transferring funds, while at the same time lowering the risk
that such methods may be used to finance terror operations or other illegal
234
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activities.240 The United States should consider placing further limits on
cash cards issued by currency exchangers that accept digital currencies.
These entities should not be exempt from the due diligence requirements
entirely, as most transactions will likely occur online instead of in person.
A graduated system would best maintain the balance between customer
freedom and management of risk. As the amount of value on the card
increases, the recording and due diligence requirements should also
increase. Purchases of cards with values of $3,000 or higher should be
subject to a higher standard of customer identification and recordkeeping.
This would be consistent with the current regulations for other financial
institutions, which require additional measures for transactions of $3,000
or more.241
B. MEASURES TO LOWER THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH INTERNATIONAL
DIGITAL CURRENCY PROVIDERS AND EXCHANGERS
[68] With increased regulation in the United States and increased
enforcement through prosecutions like the e-gold case, digital currency
providers and exchangers have an incentive to move to locations abroad
with more favorable laws.242 Although FATF has worked toward
pressuring countries to enact minimum financial regulations, there are still
jurisdictions which have fewer regulations and less stringent
enforcement.243 International efforts remain important to eliminate
loopholes that may allow digital currency providers to operate in an underregulated environment.
[69] As already mentioned, financial regulations have the dual purpose of
preventing illegal money flows and creating a paper trail for later
investigations.244 It will likely be impossible to detect and prevent all
transfers of funds intended to support terror attacks in the United States
without placing a significant burden on the financial sector and on
240
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innocent citizens who transfer funds every day. It is equally important,
however, that a paper trail exist so that investigators can later use records
in conjunction with other evidence to vet potential suspects more quickly.
The recording requirements and customer verification information could
be vital to efforts to locate an individual before an attack occurs.
[70] The greatest threat that digital currency providers and exchangers
outside U.S. jurisdiction pose is an anonymous avenue for individuals to
acquire usable funds within the United States. Digital currency providers
such as e-gold pose a greater threat when they move abroad where they
are able to avoid the U.S. regulatory regime. Individuals can access the
Internet from anywhere in the world, transfer funds via a digital currency,
and convert the account into usable funds through a cash card service.
This mechanism of transferring funds into the U.S. would thwart the
current U.S. financial checks that are meant to detect and prevent, or at
least document, questionable transfers that might be used to finance terror
operations. An individual could visit several different ATMs using one or
more cash cards, withdraw the maximum amount allowed, and within a
short time period extract several thousand dollars worth of cash without
having any personal information recorded and without leaving a paper trail
in the United States.
[71] The United States could better protect itself against such transfers in
several ways. First, as the EU has done, the United States could place
limits on the issuance of prepaid cash cards by U.S. financial institutions,
including maximum loading limits, per day and per year spending limits,
and limits on the number of cards that an individual may purchase.245 If
the issuance of a cash card exceeded the limits, it would be subject to due
diligence, recording, and reporting requirements. Second, the U.S. could
prohibit U.S. financial institutions from issuing prepaid ATM/debit cards
for international currency exchangers dealing in digital currencies that are
not subject to U.S. regulations. This measure would be more difficult to
enforce, however, and would likely require a U.S. regulatory agency to
identify and publish the names of blacklisted foreign issuers of cash cards.
[72] Third, the U.S. could prohibit financial institutions that operate
ATMs and merchant banks in the U.S. from honoring transaction requests
245
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from international currency exchangers and banks that have issued prepaid
ATM/debit cards in exchange for digital currencies. This proposal is more
complex and requires a brief discussion of how debit and ATM
transactions function. An ATM/debit card (or cash card) transaction
generally involves three players: an issuing bank or entity (business
abroad issuing the cash card), a cardholder, and the acquiring bank (bank
in the United States operating the ATM).246 This discussion focuses on
those transactions where the cardholder uses a PIN, the most common way
to extract physical cash from an account.247 The focus of this article is on
the danger presented by the anonymous transfer of funds from abroad to
usable cash in the United States. In such a scenario, an individual in the
U.S. inserts a cash card into an automated teller machine (ATM),
requesting cash. The U.S. bank or institution operating the ATM sends an
authorization request through a card system network (such as Maestro,
Cirrus, or Star) to the issuing bank or institution.248 When the issuing
institution of the cash card grants authorization, the ATM dispenses the
requested cash, and settlement between the banks or institutions may
occur immediately or at a later time.249 The individual receives the cash
anonymously, without customer information being verified or recorded.
The loophole occurs where the issuer of the card is outside the United
States, beyond the regulatory regime’s jurisdiction. Although both the
institution operating the ATM and the card system network may be subject
to U.S. jurisdiction, they have no information about the cardholder, and
the only information recorded is the amount of withdrawal and the foreign
issuing bank or institution.
[73] A solution to prevent such an anonymous transfer would be to
require those entities subject to U.S. jurisdiction, the institution operating
the ATM or the card system network, to either obtain and record sufficient
246
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customer information in the authorization process, or to altogether deny
requests for withdrawals from foreign currency exchangers that issue cash
cards. One concern is that this approach might impose too large a burden
on U.S. financial institutions to obtain such information or to keep track of
foreign entities, for which they must refuse to honor transaction requests.
Yet, the United States has already convinced many banks to voluntarily
decline to process certain transactions in the Internet gambling context. 250
This indicates that it is possible for banks to selectively decline
transactions from specific entities. In the case of online gambling,
merchants are required to code customer purchases; this allows credit card
companies to decline charges that reference gambling codes.251 The
concern is that merchants may cheat and code charges as something else,
The most effective
or route them through another merchant.252
mechanism would be to prohibit honoring transactions altogether with
foreign currency exchangers that accept digital currencies and issue cash
cards. To enforce such a system, the U.S. Treasury Department, or other
government agency, would have to maintain a list of such currency
exchangers. Regulations would require U.S. banks operating ATMs to
periodically update their systems to reflect blacklisted foreign entities.
Although the precise mechanics and implementation of this potential
solution are beyond the scope of this article, it is a solution that regulators
and those in the banking industry should discuss. The goal of the above
proposed measures is to protect against anonymous transfers of funds
without overburdening consumers or the banking industry.
VI. CONCLUSION
[74] Digital currencies and exchangers dealing in such currencies present
a risk to the United States and other nations if the applicable regulations
remain ambiguous. Allowing users of digital currencies and prepaid cash
250
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cards to take advantage of these services without identification or
customer verification requirements increases the risk of exploitation by
money launderers and those seeking to finance terrorism. The first step
will be to tighten U.S. regulations as they apply to digital currency
providers and currency exchangers, especially those offering prepaid cash
cards.
[75] The e-gold case highlights other potential legal issues surrounding
the regulation of digital currencies. Specifically including digital currency
providers in the “money services businesses” category would foreclose
many of the arguments made by the e-gold defendants and others that such
businesses are not subject to prosecution under the unlicensed money
transmitting business offense. In addition, the “engages as a business”
exception should not apply to digital currency providers, as long as the
definition makes it clear that individual liability would ensue only for
operating or maintaining a currency system, and not simply for using such
a system. These measures to regulate domestic operators of digital
currencies should be relatively uncontroversial and simple to implement.
[76] The greatest challenge of digital currencies is their tendency to
transcend jurisdictional boundaries, making effective regulation difficult.
International cooperation through organizations like FATF will be critical
in addressing this and many other challenges. In addition, the United
States should consider taking steps on its own to protect against the risks
presented by digital currencies. These may include requiring banks that
operate ATMs and accompanying card system networks to honor only
prepaid cash cards issued by financial institutions licensed in the United
States and dishonor transaction requests from unlicensed institutions.
[77] Successfully protecting against the risks posed by digital currencies
and other new payment methods will require ideas from regulators,
domestic financial institutions, foreign countries and entities, and
international organizations. The risks of digital currencies cannot be
mitigated by domestic efforts alone. It is increasingly important to work
within the framework of multilateral institutions, such as FATF, as newer
technologies and fund-transfer methods evolve. The goal of regulating
these new technologies should be to mitigate the risks posed by potential
criminal uses without completely stripping consumers of the legitimate
benefits that these technologies offer.
Digital currencies provide
42

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XV, Issue 2

consumers with an additional method of exchange, but left unchecked,
such currencies have the potential to be exploited by money launderers
and financiers of terrorism. Regulators should increase their awareness of
digital currencies and work together with the banking industry and
international partners to address the risks posed by these new fund-transfer
methods.
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